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This is OK as far as it goes, but shouldn't it go further?

Source of discontent is entirely internal to the country--no reflection of discontent with foreign relations, etc.--IF true!

What does all this mean for the future? I have the feeling that this may become the focus of US attention as a trouble spot. I guess what I find missing is anything explicit that alerts the reader to this possibility. Am I wrong?

I have no problem with the paper running in the NID with whatever is added from above... It should at least be coordinated with DDO people and perhaps State.

Ed Proctor

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OCI No. 1482/74 August 13, 1974

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ethiopia: In Search of a New Order

The end of Emperor Haile Selassie's once supreme personal rule has left Ethiopia without a center of power exercising firm executive authority. The military, since rebelling in February, has reduced the Emperor to a figure-head and established its primacy over other contenders for power. The armed forces, however, are divided within their own ranks and are unable to provide coherent leadership. They have been reluctant to assume the direct burden of governing the country.

The cabinet is virtually powerless: it governs at the sufferance of the military, but the military is unwilling to grant the cabinet sufficient authority to act and has yet to work out an effective arrangement for guiding the cabinet from behind the scenes. The general erosion of civilian authority resulting from military intervention in the political process has contributed to the drift and lack of direction.

The process of political change set in motion by the military revolt is probably irreversible. There is general agreement among the military and civilians on the broad goals of a new political structure. Most Ethiopians want an end to a system based on position, wealth, and family connections. They want more representative government and an equitable sharing of the national resources. The military and civilian leaders now in control have enunciated a few basic policies to bring about this new order, but they have no firm priorities, no program of action, and no real understanding of how to move the country step by step toward their professed goals.

Haile Selassie has already lost all effective power, and his new position as a reigning--not ruling--constitutional monarch is formalized in a draft constitution expected to be adopted by the end of the year. The Emperor

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still commands considerable prestige, and all the major contenders for power--excepting a minority group of leftist radicals--want to keep him as a symbol of national unity. The military seeks his blessing as a means of giving legitimacy to their actions, but Haile Selassie is aware he is no longer able to defy the military on major issues.

The Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (AFCC), formed in late June to direct the military's political activities, clearly sees itself as the main instrument for guiding Ethiopia's political and social transformation. The Committee has so far proved unequal to this task. Authority within the AFCC is diffuse; the composition of its inner circle seems to alter from week to week. In addition, the AFCC is beset with generational, ideological, service, and regional rivalries that have produced infighting among the officers as well as bickering between the officers and the non-commissioned officers.

Normal government operations have suffered considerably. Authority has broken down in most ministries, and officials are avoiding decisions for fear of being denounced or arrested. Earlier this month the AFCC, which has arrested over 100 prominent aristocrats and high officials, began arresting lower-ranking bureaucrats, further damaging the morale of civil servants. Government activities thus have become less efficient than ever at a time when there are high expectations of rapid change on the part of interest groups and the general public.

The appointment last month of a new prime minister has done nothing to ease the situation. Mikael Imru, whose political views generally parallel those of the AFCC, quickly lost the military's confidence by appointing cabinet ministers without the AFCC's approval. The AFCC accused four of the new ministers of corruption, and threatened to take over the government unless they were dismissed. Mikael finally capitulated, thus further undermining the cabinet's prestige. He will have to adopt a more accommodating attitude toward the AFCC if he is to remain in office.

Mikael's inability to establish a working relationship with the AFCC increases the possibility that the military will establish its own caretaker government. The major aim of such a government would be to put into force the new

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constitution, after which elections would be held for a representative government. While a new system would eventually place the country on a firmer footing, the Ethiopians have had no experience with democratic government and further painful adjustments would be inevitable. The military will be the guarantors of any future government, either as outside arbiters or as direct participants.